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IN COMBINATION: USING HYBRID RIGHTS TO EXPAND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
ABSTRACT
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects, among
other things, the right to the free exercise of religion. In 1990, the Supreme
Court held, in Employment Division v. Smith, that valid and neutral laws of
general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. While this
decision has reduced the amount of religious liberty protection available to
claimants, the decision did leave a silver lining for religious liberty claimants
in the form of hybrid rights, which involve the combination of a free exercise
claim with another constitutionally protected claim. Because the Supreme
Court in Smith did not adequately address hybrid rights, the question remains:
when can a combination of protected rights provide religious liberty to a
claimant?
Three different hybrid rights approaches have emerged: treating Smith as
dicta, allowing independent claims, and allowing colorable claims. This
Comment argues that the first two approaches completely foreclose the
possibility of hybrid rights protection, while the colorable claim approach
provides the proper avenue for religious claimants. Thus, this Comment argues
that the colorable claim approach, which combines a free exercise claim with
a constitutionally protected companion claim that has at least a probable
chance of success on the merits, is the best approach to the hybrid rights
doctrine and should be adopted by both state and federal courts.
Then, this Comment makes two arguments for the expansion of hybrid
rights. First, allowing a diversity of constitutional companion claims would
remain within the parameters of the Supreme Court’s free exercise
jurisprudence and would afford more litigants the opportunity to have their
interests balanced against those of the government. Second, once a litigant has
presented a proper hybrid claim, the reviewing court should balance the
claimant’s interests against the government’s interest using the following three
factors: whether the litigant is being compelled to act, whether an exemption
would injure others, and whether granting an exemption would violate the
Establishment Clause. If a litigant can satisfy the colorable claim approach
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standard along with these three inquiries, then the litigant should be afforded
an exemption from the general law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Christina Axson-Flynn applied for the Actor’s Training Program
at the University of Utah.1 When asked during her audition if there were
anything that she would feel uncomfortable saying as an actress, Axson-Flynn,
a Mormon, responded that “she would not . . . take the name of God in vain,
take the name of Jesus in vain, or say the four-letter expletive beginning with
the letter F.”2 Her refusal to say any of these words or phrases stemmed from
her religious beliefs.3 After the instructors tried to convince Axson-Flynn to
say one of these words during the audition, Axson-Flynn stated, “I would
rather not be admitted to your program than use these words.”4
Despite her stance, Axson-Flynn nonetheless was admitted to the program.5
During one monologue assignment, Axson-Flynn substituted other words in
place of two words she refused to say and received an “A” for her
performance.6 Upon hearing that Axson-Flynn had omitted certain words from
the monologue, one instructor told her that she would have to “get over” her
language concerns and that she could “still be a good Mormon and say those
words.”7 During another assignment, Axson-Flynn objected to the use of
particular words, and the instructor informed her that she would perform the
scene as written, or else she would receive a grade of zero.8 The instructor
ultimately relented, allowing Axson-Flynn to omit the language that was
offensive to her, and she was allowed to omit offensive language for the rest of
the semester.9
At the end of the semester review, Axson-Flynn’s instructors informed her
that her request for exemptions from using certain words was unacceptable.10
They told her, “You can choose to continue in the program if you modify your

1

Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1281 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. Her refusal to say “God” or “Christ” as profanity comes from one of the Ten Commandments: do
not take the Lord’s name in vain. Id.; see Exodus 20:7. Her refusal to use “the four-letter expletive beginning
with the letter F” stems from her belief that this word treats a sacred act as vulgar. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at
1281.
4 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1281 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1282 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
2
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values. If you don’t, you can leave. That’s your choice.”11 Axson-Flynn went
to both the program’s coordinator and the program’s director about the
situation, and both individuals backed the instructors’ position: if she refused
to say the words that she found offensive, she would have to find another
program.12
The case of Axson-Flynn v. Johnson features many differing claims; not
only do the state university’s actions seem to burden Axson-Flynn’s right to
the free exercise of religion, but they also seem to be compelling her speech,
which infringes upon another right protected by the First Amendment. This
case is one of many that has emerged in the past two decades, all presenting a
similar issue: how to resolve direct conflicts between government action and
the right to the free exercise of religion along with another constitutionally
protected right. For Christina Axson-Flynn, may her university’s acting
program force her to say words that she does not want to say in light of her
freedoms of religion and speech?13
In addition to Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, questions regarding other
combinations of rights have appeared over the past two decades. For example,
how should a court handle a case when students challenge a state school’s
policy against discrimination, arguing that such a policy violates their rights to
the free exercise of religion and expressive association?14 How should a court
handle a case when students challenge a school policy that requires students to
wear their hair short, as violating their rights to the free exercise of religion and
free speech?15 Or, how should a court handle the competing interests of a
same-sex couple’s marriage ceremony against a photography business
claiming that being forced to take pictures of the ceremony violates its rights to
the free exercise of religion and free speech?16 Finally, how should a court
handle a state law compelling a business to act against its religious conscience,
a law closely akin to the federal contraception mandate?17 Throughout all of

11

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
13 For discussion on how Axson-Flynn v. Johnson would be analyzed under this Comment’s proposal, see
infra Part V.
14 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); infra Part I.C.
15 See Ala. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319
(E.D. Tex. 1993), remanded for reconsideration by 20 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding for reconsideration
in light of RFRA); infra Part III.C.
16 See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 72 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787
(2014); infra Part IV.B.2.
17 See infra Part V; cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
12
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these examples, the question remains: does such a combination of rights add to
a litigant’s chance of success? Although courts have not always looked
favorably upon such combinations, this Comment asserts that they should.
The First Amendment begins, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”18 The
second of these religion clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, allows an individual
to practice his religious beliefs free from government interference. However,
the Free Exercise Clause has had a tumultuous history filled with differing
interpretations and levels of scrutiny.19 In 1990, the Supreme Court held that
“valid and neutral laws of general applicability” do not violate a claimant’s
right to the free exercise of religion.20 Rather than overrule previous cases that
applied differing levels of scrutiny to free exercise claims, the Court
distinguished these cases on the grounds that they involved a “hybrid
situation.”21
Hybrid situations, or hybrid rights claims, are claims that involve alleged
violations of the Free Exercise Clause and some other “constitutional
protection[].”22 Under a successful hybrid rights claim, the reviewing court
applies a stricter level of scrutiny to the law at hand than rational basis review,
which applies to naked free exercise claims.23 The remedy to a hybrid rights
claim usually does not involve finding a law unconstitutional; instead, all the
claimant seeks is an exemption from the law. To follow the law, as the
argument goes, would burden a claimant’s practice of religion or require a
claimant to violate his religious conscience, also known as the right to the free
exercise of religion.
Although the Constitution grants numerous types of general liberties, it
specifically requires religious liberty. Religious liberty has been a cornerstone
of the United States, evident by the views of early colonists,24 beliefs of the

18

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See infra Part I.A.
20 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
21 Id. at 881–82.
22 Id. at 881.
23 See infra Part I.A.
24 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 21–37 (3d ed. 2011) (describing how four views—Puritan, Evangelical, Enlightenment, and
Civic Republican—helped inform and shape early American thought on religious liberty).
19
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founders,25 and original state constitutions.26 Religious liberty was of
fundamental importance at the founding of the United States, and it remains of
the utmost importance to many people today. While there are a few limitations
to this liberty,27 the Free Exercise Clause should be able to provide exemptions
to protect an individual’s conscience.28 This Comment is premised on the
notion that religion remains an important aspect of many individuals’ lives, an
aspect that should not be cast off by the judiciary. The beliefs of many
individuals can be summed up accordingly: “A religious duty does not cease to
be a religious duty merely because the legislature has passed a generally
applicable law making compliance difficult or impossible.”29
Courts have granted exemptions from a general law based on religious
liberty since the beginning of this nation,30 and this Comment follows the
rationale of the founders and the early state constitutions: exemptions should
be utilized to protect religious liberty, not in an attempt to establish or impose
religion, but to allow anyone the opportunity to freely exercise his religion and
to remain free from violating his conscience.31 Liberty comes in many forms,
but few liberties are so central to one’s being as religious liberty. Times have
changed considerably since the founding of this nation, but one element
remains: many individuals would rather violate the laws of man than violate
what they consider to be God’s law. How, then, should courts address those
instances when government action impedes one’s religious practices or beliefs?
One method, while keeping in line with current Supreme Court precedent, is
the expansion of the hybrid rights doctrine.

25 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1449–54 (1990) (“The growing popular support for broad religious freedom within
the newly formed American states helped to shape the views of the framers of the Constitution and the free
exercise clause.”).
26 See WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 24, app. 2 at 299–303 (showing that forty-two of forty-eight
state constitutions in effect before 1947 featured a general clause explicitly protecting the liberty of
conscience, rights of conscience, or both).
27 See infra Part IV.B.2.
28 See McConnell, supra note 25, at 1512 (“[I]t is possible to say that the modern doctrine of free
exercise exemptions is more consistent with the original understanding than is a position that leads only to the
facial neutrality of legislation.”).
29 Id.
30 See id. at 1466–73 (“[E]xemptions were seen as a natural and legitimate response to the tension
between law and religious convictions.”).
31 See id. at 1511–12 (“There is no substantial evidence that such exemptions were considered
constitutionally questionable, whether as a form of establishment or as an invasion of liberty of
conscience. . . . The modern argument against religious exemptions, based on the establishment clause, is thus
historically unsupportable.”).
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In Part I, this Comment will begin with a brief overview of the strict
scrutiny regime under which free exercise claims were once considered. Then,
Part I will analyze the famous 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith,32
where the Supreme Court first introduced the concept of hybrid rights to free
exercise jurisprudence. The Supreme Court distinguished, rather than
overruled, all of the previous free exercise cases, showing that these cases
survived on some form of hybrid theory. Part I will also exhibit what naked
free exercise claims look like after Smith, which highlights the need for hybrid
analysis in the courts. In particular, it will show how hybrid rights cases
provide stronger protections for religious liberty than naked free exercise
cases.
Part II will then examine the three-way interpretive split that has developed
in the Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding hybrid rights claims. Part II will
also demonstrate that clear guidance from the Supreme Court in this area is
vital and that litigants will suffer from the consequences as long as there is not
a clear standard.
Part III will demonstrate why the colorable claim approach is the best
solution to the issue of hybrid rights. Then, Part III will explore the
justifications of the colorable claim approach and describe how this approach
is most similar to the distinguished free exercise cases. Finally, Part III will
consider how courts have successfully applied the colorable claim approach.
This Comment asserts that the colorable claim approach is the proper
interpretation, evident by the protection it has provided litigants as opposed to
other approaches.
Part IV will argue that the hybrid rights approach can be expanded to
provide even more protection to litigants. To effect this expansion, Part IV will
demonstrate that hybrid rights can expand to other rights that courts have not
commonly considered as companion claims. Such combinations are still within
the Supreme Court’s acceptable parameters. Then, Part IV will assert that
courts should not be so hesitant to balance the relevant factors between the
government and the claimant. When a claimant is compelled to act, granting an
exemption would not injure another, and granting an exemption would not
violate the Establishment Clause, the reviewing court should strongly consider
granting an exemption to protect the claimant’s religious liberty.

32

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Finally, Part V will consider the application of the hybrid rights approach
to Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, described at the beginning of this Introduction, and
to a hypothetical state contraception mandate to consider how a state court
would apply the hybrid rights doctrine to a law closely akin to the federal
contraception mandate. These applications will exhibit the proper approach to
the hybrid rights doctrine and show that the Free Exercise Clause can still
afford protection to religious liberty.
I. ALTERING THE FREE EXERCISE LANDSCAPE
The Free Exercise Clause has had a tumultuous history, filled with varying
judicial interpretations. Before examining how hybrid rights can expand
religious liberty, it is important to understand the history of the Free Exercise
Clause and how it has been interpreted over the past few decades. First, this
Part will give a brief history of the Free Exercise Clause and of cases decided
under strict scrutiny. Second, this Part will analyze the shift in the level of
scrutiny announced in Employment Division v. Smith and highlight the birth of
the hybrid rights doctrine. Finally, this Part will demonstrate the ramifications
of the Smith holding on naked free exercise claims and describe the
Congressional reaction to the decision.
A. The Free Exercise Clause Pre-1990
The Free Exercise Clause was invoked rarely in the first century and a half
of America’s existence. Even those cases that did arise under the religion
clauses rarely sought an exemption from general laws until 1878,33 when the
Court finally handled its first major Free Exercise Clause challenge and
applied a very low level of scrutiny to a statute forbidding polygamy.34 This
low level of scrutiny, commonly known as rational basis review, meant that the
reviewing court would uphold the law if it were in pursuit of a legitimate
governmental interest and if it were reasonably related to that interest.35 This
standard was an easy one for the government to satisfy, and every Supreme
33 See McConnell, supra note 25, at 1503. McConnell also suggests that the actual practices during
America’s first century favored exemptions, even though appellate decisions went the other way. See id. at
1511.
34 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879) (“To permit [polygamy] would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.”). The Court’s
first free exercise case was Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, but the Court’s inquiry into the Free
Exercise Clause is quite uninformative. See 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
35 WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 24, at 135.
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Court application of rational basis review in a Free Exercise Clause case over
the next sixty years resulted in a win for the government.36
The level of scrutiny changed when the modern era of the Free Exercise
Clause emerged in 1940 as the Supreme Court, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
held that the Free Exercise Clause applies to the states by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment.37 Additionally, the Court applied a higher level of
scrutiny to allow Cantwell, a Jehovah’s Witness, to distribute religious
literature in spite of a law forbidding religious solicitation without a permit.38
This new, heightened standard of review, commonly known as the
intermediate scrutiny test, meant that the reviewing court would uphold the law
only if it were in pursuit of an important or significant governmental interest
and if it were substantially related to that interest.39 This standard would last
for the next twenty years and resulted in a fairly even split between cases
holding for the government and cases holding for the free exercise claimant.40
The level of scrutiny changed yet again in 1963 when the Supreme Court,
in Sherbert v. Verner, first applied the strict scrutiny standard to exempt a
Seventh-Day Adventist from a law denying unemployment benefits to anyone
who failed to accept work without good cause after the claimant refused to
work on Saturday, her Sabbath day.41 This strict scrutiny standard, also called
the compelling interest test, meant that the reviewing court would only uphold
the law if it were in pursuit of a compelling governmental interest and if it
were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, not intruding on the claimant’s
rights any more than was absolutely necessary.42 This standard was the most
difficult standard for the government to satisfy, and in the years after Sherbert,
free exercise claimants won six out of ten cases that went before the Supreme
Court.43 The compelling interest standard would remain the standard for free
exercise cases until the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,

36

Id. at 137.
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
38 Id. at 311 (“[I]n the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as
constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the petitioner’s communication . . .
raised no such clear and present menace . . . .”).
39 WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 24, at 135.
40 Id.
41 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (holding that the State could only burden the free exercise of religion if it
could be “justified by a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional
power to regulate’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))).
42 WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 24, at 135.
43 Id. at 137.
37
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a case that remains “fraught with complexity both in doctrine and in
practice.”44
B. Employment Division v. Smith
In the 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, the United States Supreme
Court changed the level of scrutiny for free exercise claims back to the lowest
level of scrutiny, rational basis review.45 In Smith, the plaintiffs were denied
state unemployment compensation after they were fired from their jobs for
workplace “misconduct.”46 This “misconduct” involved ingesting peyote, a
banned substance under Oregon criminal law, for sacramental purposes at a
ceremony of the Native American Church.47 In breaking from its previous free
exercise decisions, the Court held that “the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law
of general applicability.”48 To effect this new interpretation, the Court
determined that the compelling government interest test from Sherbert was
inadequate.49
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, could not understand why religious
objections to valid and neutral laws should outweigh the function of
government: “To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where
the State’s interest is ‘compelling’ . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense.”50 To Justice Scalia, “valid and neutral laws of general
applicability” should not be subjected to any kind of balancing approach: “[I]t
is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the
importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.”51
While the Smith decision put an abrupt halt to the previous decades of
expanding free exercise protection, Justice Scalia did hold out some religious
44 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
45 See 494 U.S. 872, 876–77 (1990).
46 Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
49 Id. at 885 (“We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast
majority of our precedents, is to hold the [compelling government interest] test inapplicable to such
challenges.”).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 889 n.5.
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liberty protection by introducing the doctrine of so-called hybrid rights. In an
attempt to distinguish this new free exercise jurisprudence from previous
decisions, Scalia explained the hybrid rights doctrine as follows: “The only
decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of
a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections.”52 Although he did not
elaborate upon how these hybrid rights cases should be handled by a reviewing
court, Justice Scalia explicitly noted five constitutional rights that could
combine with a free exercise claim to form a hybrid claim: freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, the right of parents to direct the education of their
children, freedom from compelled expression, and freedom of association.53
Analysis of these cases provides guidance for how hybrid claims should be
handled in future cases.
Justice Scalia first cited cases involving freedom of speech and of the
press.54 In each of these three cases, the Supreme Court invalidated laws
requiring either a licensing system or a flat tax on religious solicitations.55
These cases show that when a law restricts the freedoms of speech or press,
protections expressly mentioned in the First Amendment, these rights can join
the right to the free exercise of religion to form a successful hybrid rights
claim. Since Smith, these types of hybrid cases have been the most successful
in the lower courts.56
Justice Scalia then gave two examples of cases involving the right of
parents to direct the education of their children.57 In each of these cases, the
Court held that parents have a great responsibility in the upbringing of their
children and that this right deserves considerable protection.58 These cases
further expanded the hybrid rights doctrine: the companion claim joining the
52

Id. at 881.
Id. at 881–82.
54 Id. at 881 (citing Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
55 See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (holding that a licensing system for religious solicitations was
invalid).
56 See infra Part III.C.
57 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
58 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (holding that a state law compelling Amish parents to send their children to
school past the eighth grade violated their right to the free exercise of religion); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
53
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free exercise claim does not have to be expressly mentioned in the
Constitution; it only has to be one that affords a “constitutional protection[].”59
Next, Justice Scalia gave two examples of cases prohibiting compelled
expression.60 While each of these cases was decided solely upon compelled
speech grounds, they were still presented as a hybrid combination of the rights
to free exercise and free speech.61 Compelled speech is a violation of the right
to free speech, and in general, the government will have trouble when it seeks
to compel action.62
Finally, Justice Scalia explained that another example of a hybrid rights
case could be a claim involving the freedom of association, although he did not
give an example of a case in which a claimant had successfully brought such a
claim.63 He did, however, explain what a freedom of association hybrid rights
claim might look like.64 Although courts generally have not applied the
freedom of association to hybrid rights claims, it is still a viable option, one
that claimants should readily use in the future.65
Rather than overrule many free exercise cases from the past century, Justice
Scalia distinguished those successful free exercise claims as presenting “a
hybrid situation.”66 Much debate has ensued regarding these hybrid rights,67
and this debate has coincided with the reaction to and the application of Smith
by the lower courts, which have grappled with the concept of hybrid rights
without further guidance from the Supreme Court.

59

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
Id. at 882 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943)).
61 Id. (“Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free speech
grounds, have also involved freedom of religion . . . .”).
62 See infra Part IV.B.1.
63 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
64 Id. (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)). Justice Scalia pointed to the language
from Jaycees, in which the Court noted, “An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a
correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622).
65 See infra Part IV.A.
66 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
67 See infra Part II.
60

RUMMAGE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

3/19/2015 9:49 AM

USING HYBRID RIGHTS

1187

C. Post-Smith Application
The backlash from Smith was severe. Numerous scholars expressed
concern over the court’s narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause,68 and other
members of the Supreme Court echoed these concerns in regard to abandoning
the compelling interest test, arguing that “courts have been quite capable of
applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing state interests.”69 However, despite the abrupt
change,70 every free exercise challenge now is analyzed in light of the rule in
Smith, and this light has not shone very brightly in favor of religious liberty
claimants.
Since Smith, for example, consider how a claimant will quickly lose any
naked free exercise challenge, as seen in the Supreme Court’s recent
exposition into the free exercise doctrine, Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez.71 In Christian Legal Society, a law school’s Christian Legal Society
required members to hold particular religious convictions and abstain from
premarital sex and homosexual conduct, and sought an exemption from the
school’s nondiscrimination policy in order to limit membership accordingly.72
Among the arguments advanced by the society was that failure to grant an
exemption would violate the society’s First Amendment rights to free speech,
expressive association, and free exercise of religion.73 However, the school
refused to register the society as a student organization because of its refusal to
follow the nondiscrimination policy.74 Because the federal district court held
68 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4 (“The Free
Exercise Clause is now principally a special case of equal protection, forbidding religious discrimination. . . .
[T]he Free Exercise Clause itself now has little independent substantive content.”). For a thorough collection
of the criticism following Smith, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (arguing that the decision was wrongly decided for two reasons: lack
of historical justification and inconsistencies in the Court’s theoretical First Amendment arguments), and
James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1407, 1409 n.15 (1992).
69 Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
70 Compare Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In such cases
as Sherbert v. Verner, Wisconsin v. Yoder, . . . we held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
required religious beliefs to be accommodated by granting religion-specific exemptions from otherwise
applicable laws.” (citations omitted)), with Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate.”).
71 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
72 Id. at 671–72.
73 Id. at 673.
74 Id. at 672–73.
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that hybrid rights were not applicable in this case,75 it came before the
Supreme Court as a naked challenge to the free exercise of religion. As a naked
free exercise challenge, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge without
much analysis because the university’s policy was a valid regulation of general
application.76 From Smith to Christian Legal Society, the Supreme Court has
been clear: unless the State has clearly singled out religion for unfavorable
treatment,77 claimants will not receive any sort of protection against valid and
neutral laws.
In response to the Smith decision and out of a desire to return free exercise
jurisprudence to how it was pre-Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993.78 Because “in Employment Division v. Smith,
the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion,”79 Congress decided “to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”80 Congress provided that
a religious exemption could be denied only if the government can prove that
the law “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”81
Despite religious liberty advocates’ excitement over the law, RFRA was short
lived. Just four years after its enactment, the Supreme Court held RFRA
unconstitutional as it applied to the states in violation of Congress’s powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment.82 In response to this decision, Congress
75 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217, at *26 (N.D. Cal. May 19,
2006) (“Because the Court finds that none of CLS’s claims for violations of their constitutional rights have
merit, there is no basis for their alleged ‘hybrid-rights’ claim.”).
76 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 697 n.27 (“CLS briefly argues that Hastings’ all-comers condition
violates the Free Exercise Clause. Our decision in Smith forecloses that argument.” (citations omitted)); see
also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Eck, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1052 (D. Mont. 2009) (“Because Plaintiffs’ free
speech claim fails as a matter of law, there is no basis for a ‘hybrid rights’ claim warranting strict scrutiny.”).
77 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (rejecting the argument that denial of funding for
religious training was singling out religion for unfavorable treatment); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (holding that a city’s laws prohibiting animal sacrifice were void
because they stemmed from animosity toward a particular religion).
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (invalidating the applicability of the Act to the States and States’ subdivisions); see also Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
79 Id. § 2000bb(a)(4) (citation omitted).
80 Id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted).
81 Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
82 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“RFRA was designed to control cases and
controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”).

RUMMAGE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

3/19/2015 9:49 AM

USING HYBRID RIGHTS

1189

passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to
handle free exercise claims challenging state laws regulating religious practice
in prison settings and religious land use.83 The Supreme Court upheld this
legislation against an Establishment Clause challenge in Cutter v. Wilkinson.84
Thus, three standards remain for greater free exercise protection: RFRA
applies to challenges brought under federal law, RLUIPA applies to state and
local laws dealing with religious practice in prison settings and religious land
use, and the hybrid rights doctrine applies to the vast number of remaining
issues challenging state and local laws. While much has been written about
RFRA, RLUIPA, and whether statutes can provide greater protection to
religious liberty,85 the remainder of this Comment will argue that expanding
the hybrid rights doctrine put forth by Justice Scalia in Smith is the best way to
provide protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
II. CURRENT HYBRID RIGHTS APPROACHES
In the years since Smith, commentators and courts alike have attempted to
provide meaning and understanding to the hybrid rights doctrine. A hybrid
rights claim involves a challenge that the government is simultaneously
violating one’s right to the free exercise of religion and some other
“constitutional protection[].”86 The strength of this other constitutional
protection, known as the companion claim, determines whether a hybrid rights
claim will be successful.
Three interpretations of the hybrid rights doctrine have emerged—dicta,
independent claims, and the colorable claim approach—and United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on which of these approaches should rule.
Thus, debates regarding these three approaches will continue until the Supreme
Court clarifies the proper approach to hybrid rights. In the absence of further
clarification, the divergent approaches taken by the circuit courts remain the

83 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012); see also Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803.
84 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (“On its face, the Act qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation
of religion that is not barred by the Establishment Clause.”).
85 See, e.g., Erin N. East, Comment, I Object: The RLUIPA as a Model for Protecting the Conscience
Rights of Religious Objectors to Same-Sex Relationships, 59 EMORY L.J. 259 (2009) (arguing that RLUIPA
provides an effective model for a more flexible statutory approach to reconciling the conflict between the
rights of same-sex couples and the rights of religious objectors); Ryan, supra note 68 (arguing that enacting
RFRA to reestablish the compelling interest test is a futile endeavor).
86 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
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law and must, therefore, be discussed and analyzed. The three sections that
follow will discuss these three approaches in detail.
A. Dicta
The first approach expressly ignores the hybrid rights approach of free
exercise jurisprudence and simply considers Justice Scalia’s language in Smith
regarding hybrid rights to be pure dicta. So far, the Second, Third, and Sixth
Circuits have adopted the dicta approach, and a later concurring opinion by
Justice Souter has provided further support for this interpretation.
The Second Circuit first rejected the hybrid rights theory in Knight v.
Connecticut Department of Public Health, a case in which a state agency
reprimanded two employees for discussing religious beliefs with clients while
on the job.87 In response to the employees’ argument that this was a hybrid
situation regarding the rights of free speech and free exercise of religion, the
Second Circuit concluded that Smith’s “language relating to hybrid claims is
dicta and not binding on this court.”88 The Second Circuit elaborated its
position further two years later by explaining that “[w]e . . . can think of no
good reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the number of
constitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been violated.”89
Like the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit has also rejected hybrid claims
as dicta. In Combs v. Homer-Center School District, a group of parents brought
a hybrid rights claim, challenging the state’s compulsory laws regarding
home-school education as an infringement upon their rights to freely exercise
their religion and to direct their children’s upbringing.90 The Third Circuit
conducted a thorough examination of how other circuit courts were handling
hybrid claims and concluded, “Until the Supreme Court provides direction, we
believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta.”91 The Third Circuit affirmed this
interpretation again the very next year.92

87

275 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 166–67.
89 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
90 540 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 2008).
91 Id. at 247.
92 McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 647 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have neither applied nor
expressly endorsed a hybrid rights theory, and will not do so today. . . . Our reluctance to do so is reinforced by
the decisions of our sister courts.”).
88
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The Sixth Circuit has produced the strongest language by a court of appeals
in favor of the dicta approach to date, the oft-cited Kissinger v. Board of
Trustees.93 In regard to a hybrid rights claim challenging a state university’s
curriculum as violating the rights to free exercise and free speech, the court in
Kissinger explained that it would not make sense if a state regulation could
violate free exercise rights with the addition of other constitutional rights but
could not violate the Free Exercise Clause by itself.94 Thus, the court viewed
hybrid claims as “completely illogical” and explained that it would not apply a
stricter standard than the one from Smith until the Supreme Court did so first.95
In light of these circuit courts of appeals’ views, perhaps the most
important voice in support of the dicta approach belongs to Justice Souter.96 In
his concurring opinion in Lukumi, Justice Souter described hybrid rights “as
ultimately untenable.”97 He expressed doubt as to the utility of hybrid rights
claims:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would
cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and
associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual.98

Along with calling for Smith to be reconsidered as a whole, Justice Souter was
not persuaded by the Smith majority’s attempts at distinguishing free exercise
cases in this hybrid fashion.99
The basis for these courts of appeals and Justice Souter’s rejection of
hybrid claims is solidly grounded. Admittedly, it would be illogical simply to
allow a litigant to win a free exercise challenge just because he can present
multiple constitutional challenges. Even other circuits, which do recognize
hybrid claims, refuse to “bootstrap” free exercise claims by attaching any
companion claim whatsoever, such as a weak or unsuccessful claim, to create a

93

Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 180.
95 Id.
96 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 577 (noting that Smith should be reconsidered and the “existing tension” of the Free
Exercise Clause remains to be handled “another day”).
97 Id. at 567.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 566.
94
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hybrid rights claim.100 When viewed in terms of adding any constitutional
claim whatsoever or bootstrapping claims and expecting success, such
expectations should be considered untenable. However, the dicta approach
ultimately is misguided.
While the rejection of hybrid claims allows judges to quickly dispose of
unnecessary and frivolous free exercise challenges, it should not be the
standard because it does not allow for any balancing of interests. In this model,
the Free Exercise Clause becomes worthless, and a litigant is left hoping that
his secular challenges can succeed because his free exercise claims, no matter
how strong or convincing, will not provide any protection so long as they are
up against a “valid and neutral law of general applicability.”101 Just as Justice
Scalia feared the extreme scenario of “a system in which each conscience is a
law unto itself,”102 Justice Souter seems to fear the opposite result, that is, “a
hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated.”103 Perhaps both justices ultimately fear the result articulated by Ira
Lupu: “Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a
voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain
of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe.”104 Yet, this fear
of free exercise exemptions should not keep courts from engaging in hybrid
rights analysis. The only thing worse than allowing any additional claim
combined with a free exercise claim to clog up the court system is to
completely preclude the option of religious liberty protection through hybrid
rights, and that is precisely what the dicta approach does. In Smith, Justice
Scalia wrote that previous free exercise cases presented a hybrid situation,105
meaning that hybrid situations must exist and must mean something. Because
the dicta approach does not allow for the hybrid rights doctrine to be
considered at all, it should not be used to adjudicate hybrid rights claims.

100 Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[N]o court has ever allowed
a plaintiff to bootstrap a free exercise claim in this manner. We decline to be the first.” (citation omitted)).
101 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
102 Id. at 890.
103 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
104 Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989).
105 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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B. Independent Claims
The second approach to hybrid claims holds that a hybrid rights claim is
appropriate only when the companion claim can win on its own without the
free exercise claim. The First and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted
this independent-claims approach.
The First Circuit reviewed a hybrid rights challenge that high-school-aged
children should not be required to attend a compulsory sexual education
program at their public high school, in Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Productions, Inc.106 The court distinguished these facts from the hybrid
challenge in Yoder and rejected the parents’ hybrid rights claim because the
free exercise claim was “not conjoined with an independently protected
constitutional protection.”107 Although Brown did not explicitly state that the
First Circuit was adopting the independent-claims approach,108 the First
Circuit109 and other Circuit Courts of Appeals110 have read Brown to invoke
the independent-claims theory.
The District of Columbia Circuit has also adopted the independent-claims
theory. In Henderson v. Kennedy, a religious group stated that a law forbidding
the sale of t-shirts at the National Mall violated its right to free exercise and
free speech, even though no one was permitted to sell t-shirts at the National
Mall.111 The court explained that, for the litigant’s hybrid rights claim to
succeed, the court would have to conclude that “the combination of two
untenable claims equals a tenable one.”112 Although Henderson did not
explicitly state that the District of Columbia Circuit was adopting the
independent-claims theory, the District Court for the District of Columbia now
considers hybrid claims utilizing this theory.113

106

68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id. at 539.
108 Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 n.9 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Brown did not explicitly consider this
debate . . . . Thus we do not read Brown as having settled this question . . . .”).
109 See Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004), aff’g 241 F. Supp. 2d 111, 121
(D.N.H. 2003).
110 See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
111 253 F.3d 12, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
112 Id. at 19.
113 See, e.g., Mahoney v. Dist. of Columbia, 662 F. Supp. 2d 74, 95 n.12 (D.D.C. 2009).
107
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However, this is the weakest of the hybrid interpretations.114 Just as a
rejection of hybrid claims altogether is too restrictive on the Free Exercise
Clause, the independent-claims theory propounded by the First and District of
Columbia Circuits ultimately does not properly handle free exercise claims.
Without explicitly saying so, it appears that these two circuit courts became
weary at the idea of litigants receiving strict scrutiny just by throwing multiple
constitutional challenges at a court. To avoid this result, these two courts are
essentially saying that, to receive strict scrutiny, the additional claim must be
so persuasive that it is able to win independently from the free exercise claim.
However, even amidst arguments that this approach is equivalent to the
Court’s approach in Smith,115 the problem with this standard is evident: if the
requirement is that the additional constitutional challenge must independently
win to invoke a hybrid rights claim, then there is no need for a hybrid rights
analysis in the first place.
Other courts have taken issue with this interpretation as well. In 2004, the
Tenth Circuit refused to adopt this approach because “it makes no sense to
adopt a strict standard that essentially requires a successful companion claim
because such a test would make the free exercise claim unnecessary.”116 This
approach is also redundant because “[i]f the plaintiff’s additional constitutional
claim is successful, he or she would typically not need the free exercise claim
and the hybrid rights exception would add nothing to the case.”117 In addition
to rejecting the concept of hybrid rights as a whole, Justice Souter’s comments
in Lukumi further discount this independent approach:
[I]f a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under
another constitutional provision, then there would have been no
reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have
mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.118

114 Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1494,
1502 (2010) (describing this approach as the “weakest attempt” to give true meaning to the hybrid rights
language in Smith).
115 See Ryan M. Akers, Begging the High Court for Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employment
Division v. Smith, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 77, 99 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Smith combined an
independent claim, not merely a colorable claim, with the free exercise claim).
116 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2004).
117 Id. at 1297.
118 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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While the ultimate standard for analyzing hybrid approaches may still be
unclear, it is clear that this is not the proper approach.
C. Colorable Claims
The third major approach to hybrid rights claims is the colorable claim
approach, which holds that a hybrid rights claim is one that includes a free
exercise claim and a companion claim that has a probable, or colorable, chance
of success on its own. The Tenth and Ninth Circuits have adopted this
colorable claim approach.
The Tenth Circuit first considered hybrid rights in Swanson v. Guthrie
Independent School District No. I-L, a case involving the rights of parents to
direct their child’s upbringing in combination with their right to freely exercise
their religion when a school district refused the parents’ request to send their
home-schooled child to the public school part time.119 The court rejected the
parents’ hybrid claim against the public school’s policy, explaining that a
hybrid rights claim “at least requires a colorable showing of infringement of
recognized and specific constitutional rights.”120 While the colorable claim
approach is much more liberal than the previous two approaches, the Tenth
Circuit did place a restraint on those attempting to bring a hybrid rights claim:
“[W]e believe that simply raising such a claim is not a talisman that
automatically leads to the application of the compelling-interest test.”121 The
Tenth Circuit has affirmed this approach in later decisions and defined
“colorable” as “a fair probability or likelihood, but not a certitude, of success
on the merits.”122 The court further explained that analysis of this colorable
claim approach should be “very fact driven” and examined on a “case-by-case
basis.”123
The Ninth Circuit has agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s approach and first
considered hybrid rights claims in depth in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission, a case in which religious landlords refused to rent to unmarried

119
120
121
122
123

135 F.3d 694, 696 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 700.
Id. at 699.
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1297.
Id.
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couples.124 Although ultimately vacated due to a lack of ripeness,125 the Ninth
Circuit announced that it would follow the Tenth Circuit and the original
district court decision in adopting the colorable claim approach.126 This
approach was affirmed when the court clarified that a plaintiff cannot “allege a
hybrid rights claim entitled to strict scrutiny analysis merely by combining a
free exercise claim with an utterly meritless claim of the violation of another
alleged fundamental right.”127
Of the three main approaches to hybrid rights claims—dicta, independent
claims, and the colorable claim approach—the colorable claim approach is the
best interpretation of the rule set out in Smith and comes the closest to giving
the Free Exercise Clause its appropriate worth in a balancing scheme.
Numerous commentators over the years have reached the same conclusion,128
and this Comment endorses this approach.129 However, just like the two
approaches discussed before it, the colorable claim approach, albeit better, is
not free from its detractors who argue that the colorable claim approach
impermissibly grants favorable treatment to claimants based on religion.130
Yet, in contrast to the dicta approach and the independent-claims approach, the
colorable claim approach at least incorporates a balancing test, which this
Comment asserts is in line with the proper approach.131

124

2000).

165 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc on ripeness grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.

125 Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1147–48 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“Thus we postpone, perhaps
serendipitously, but ineluctably, definitive application of [Smith] and its newly developed hybrid rights
doctrine . . . .” (citation omitted)).
126 See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705.
127 Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
128 See, e.g., Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the Oregon
Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 600 (2003) (“The
colorable claim standard, properly applied, appears to most closely approximate the design of Smith.”);
Timothy J. Santoli, Note, A Decade After Employment Division v. Smith: Examining How Courts Are Still
Grappling with the Hybrid Rights Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 649, 670 (2001) (“Thus, the ‘colorable claim’ theory to the hybrid-rights exception is best suited to
weigh the companion claim.”); John L. Tuttle, Note, Adding Color: An Argument for the Colorable Showing
Approach to Hybrid Rights Claims Under Employment Division v. Smith, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 741, 742
(2005) (“This article contends the colorable showing approach to the hybrid rights exception of Smith is the
most appropriate approach adopted by the lower courts.”).
129 See infra Part III.
130 See Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and
Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 191–92 (2002) (concluding that the colorable claim approach violates
fundamental rights by treating people differently based on religious beliefs); Note, supra note 114, at 1506
(“[C]olorable claim analysis nonetheless places the two Religion Clauses in direct conflict.”).
131 See infra Part IV.B.
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Until the Supreme Court clarifies the proper way to asses hybrid rights
claims, the Court’s lack of guidance creates a trifurcated problem for litigants
attempting to address religious liberty claims: first, litigants are failing to fully
brief claims, either by abandoning hybrid rights claims or improperly briefing
them, denying courts the opportunity to consider hybrid rights claims;132
second, some courts have become unwilling to address or adjudicate hybrid
rights claims without further guidance from the Supreme Court, denying
potential relief to deserving claimants;133 and third, qualified immunity134 often
will prevent litigants from obtaining damages in free exercise cases.135 These
problems are all in addition to the glaring inconsistency among the circuit
courts of appeals, leading to justice being available to some claimants but not
others solely based on the claimant’s geographical location. In the absence of
further guidance from the Supreme Court, this Comment argues that the
colorable claim approach is the best option available to protect religious liberty
and promotes the idea that all circuit courts should adopt the colorable claim
approach to state and local free exercise cases.
III. THE BEST APPROACH: COLORABLE COMPANION CLAIMS
After consideration of the current hybrid rights approaches and the glaring
issues with the dicta and independent-claims approaches, what is to be done
with hybrid rights claims? In light of the Smith decision, can hybrid rights
provide proper religious liberty protection, a liberty with a fundamental
132 See Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 33 n.5 (10th Cir. 2013) (“On appeal, Plaintiffs
argue their free exercise claim but abandon the hybrid claim theory. We therefore do not discuss the hybrid
claim theory in this opinion.”); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 75–76 (N.M. 2013)
(refusing to address the hybrid rights argument because the issue had been improperly briefed with a mere
“three-sentence paragraph”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); see also Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division
v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 267 (“At the very least,
pressing hybrid claims wherever plausible will presumably result in either an explanation and reaffirmation of
‘free exercise plus,’ or an ultimate admission by the Court that the theory was no more than an unprincipled
attempt to pretend that Yoder survived Smith.”).
133 See Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘hybrid rights’
doctrine has been widely criticized, and, notably, no court has ever allowed a plaintiff to bootstrap a free
exercise claim in this manner. We decline to be the first.” (citations omitted)); see also Ass’n of Christian Sch.
Int’l v. Stearns, 362 F. App’x 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing no reason to depart from the decision in Jacobs).
134 The defense of “[q]ualified immunity shields public officials from . . . liability if their actions did not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1467
(10th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 Id. at 1297 (concluding that remanding to the lower court to consider the Plaintiff’s hybrid rights claim
for monetary damages and declaratory relief was “pointless” because the Defendants would be entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity on the hybrid rights claim).
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importance dating back to the framing of the Constitution? How should lower
courts handle free exercise cases when another fundamental right is also at
play? As easy as it might be to completely dismiss hybrid rights, Smith
distinguished previous cases on the grounds that they featured hybrid claims,
and courts should not simply ignore these hybrid situations.136 Hybrid rights
must mean something. Therefore, despite the deficiencies of the current hybrid
rights approaches, this Comment asserts that the hybrid rights doctrine can and
must be utilized to provide religious liberty protections to litigants.
To effect such protection, this Comment argues for the colorable claim
approach. This Part will argue that the colorable claim approach is the best
approach to hybrid rights claims for three reasons: first, a low-threshold,
colorable claim approach is the best approach for providing claimants with
religious liberty protection; second, combining factors or claims to make one
successful claim is a common practice for the Supreme Court; and third, the
colorable claim approach has provided the most protection in the years since
Smith, and lower courts have found this approach to be the most useful.
A. The Colorable Claim Approach Has the Greatest Potential to Protect
First, this Comment argues that, of the three approaches,137 the proper
approach to hybrid rights is the colorable claim approach because it has the
greatest potential to protect litigants from violations of the right to the free
exercise of religion. However, this Comment argues for the colorable claim
approach as written, not necessarily the colorable claim approach as it has been
shied away from by courts. As always, the issue with the colorable claim
approach is whether the companion claim is, in fact, truly colorable.
As identified by the Tenth Circuit, a “colorable” companion claim is one
that has “a fair probability or likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the
merits.”138 A successful colorable companion claim is located on the “middle
ground between the two extremes of painting hybrid rights claims too
generously and construing them too narrowly,” as the Tenth Circuit explained
in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson.139 This requires that the companion claim be more

136

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We will not lightly
presume that . . . the Supreme Court was wasting its breath.”), vacated en banc on ripeness grounds, 220 F.3d
1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
137 See supra Part II.
138 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1297.
139 Id. at 1295.
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than just “non-frivolous”140 but less than a successful companion claim on its
own, which would make the free exercise clause unnecessary.141
When applying the colorable claim approach as written, the threshold for
determining what constitutes a colorable claim should be low because
concluding that a litigant has a proper hybrid rights claim is not dispositive—it
only determines the level of scrutiny. Rather, only once a court determines that
it is dealing with a hybrid rights case should it engage in a balancing of the
competing interests.142 This second step is far more important to the ultimate
determination of whether an exemption should be granted than the first step of
determining whether the companion claim is colorable.
This low threshold will allow worthy claims to advance to the second step
but still weed out the non-hybrid claims. The best example of a litigant’s
inability to invoke hybrid rights claims is the Smith case itself. In Smith, the
plaintiffs brought a naked free exercise claim that did not invoke any other
constitutional claims.143 Although at least one commentator argues that the
litigants could have received hybrid protection based on the free exercise of
religion along with the rights to free speech and association,144 these other
rights were not “colorable” enough to warrant hybrid attention, although this is
exactly the analysis that a reviewing court must undertake. The Smith litigants’
free speech or freedom of association arguments had an almost zero likelihood
of success on the merits, far below the level of success required for colorable
claims.
While cases that cannot employ a companion claim at all will ultimately
fail, by making the colorable threshold a low one, more litigants will be able to
come to the courts for protection. However, the colorable claim approach is not
without its detractors.145 According to one critic, the colorable claim is flawed
because its approach departs “from the traditional understanding of
140

Id. (citing Harline v. DEA, 148 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 1297.
142 See infra Part IV.B.
143 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
144 Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General
Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 858 (2001) (arguing that the litigants should have
received hybrid rights protection and did not only because the case was decided without the briefing of this
“undiscovered” concept).
145 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free Exercise
Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119, 140 (2000) (claiming that the colorable claim standard is paradoxical since free
exercise rights are less protected than other constitutional rights in some cases but are more protected in other
cases).
141
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constitutional rights.”146 As the argument goes, a hybrid rights approach
departs from the traditional understanding of constitutional rights since a
constitutional right has either been violated or it has not.147 The District of
Columbia Circuit, an advocate of the independent-claims approach, has argued
that “in law as in mathematics zero plus zero equals zero.”148 However, as one
commentator has responded to the District of Columbia Circuit, “it is equally
true that the sum of a number of fractions—one-half plus one-half, for
example—may equal one.”149
This response to the District of Columbia Circuit sums up the colorable
claim approach perfectly: the colorable claim approach can still afford
protection to litigants in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Smith. Justice Scalia’s language in Smith distinguished, rather than
overruled, all of the case law regarding the Free Exercise Clause, meaning that
hybrid rights must mean something. The dicta and independent-claims
approaches relegate hybrid rights to a position of zero worth, a position that is
inconsistent with the Smith decision. Further, “[i]f the Free Exercise Clause is
viewed as enacting a zero-sum game between democracy and religious
pluralism, we will all lose something of inestimable value.”150 A hybrid rights
approach does not have to be a zero-sum game between religious freedom and
an artificial Free Exercise Clause, and the colorable claim approach is the
proper way to honor religious freedom and provide substance to the Free
Exercise Clause. Any claimant that is able to show a free exercise claim along
with a colorable companion claim deserves to have these interests balanced
against the government’s countervailing interest.
B. Combining Factors Is a Common Practice for the Supreme Court
The idea of combining factors into a successful claim, as the colorable
claim approach does, is not unique to free exercise litigation. For example,
other constitutional protections, such as the right to privacy, have their origins
in the combination of multiple constitutional rights. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that a state law prohibiting the use of
contraception for married couples was unconstitutional because it violated the

146
147
148
149
150

Note, supra note 114, at 1504.
Id. at 1504–05.
Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Duncan, supra note 144, at 858.
Id. at 855.
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right to privacy.151 The Court explained that “specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance” before holding that “[v]arious guarantees create
zones of privacy.”152 These guarantees include the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments.153
If the companion claim in a hybrid rights case were sufficient on its own,
then the hybrid rights doctrine would not be needed. The foundation of the
hybrid rights doctrine relies on the ability of more than one claim combining to
form a winning argument. On this point, the Supreme Court seems clear:
multiple constitutional rights strengthen the potential success of a claim. Just
as the right to privacy is guaranteed despite the fact that it is not based on one
singular protection, but a combination of protections, a free exercise claim
should be guaranteed when it is brought in combination with another strong
constitutional protection.
For another analogy, consider an example from criminal law: reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Arvizu, a border
patrol officer stopped a van on an unpaved road in a remote area of Arizona
after he witnessed common signs of drug smuggling.154 The officer noticed
that the defendant, who was driving on a very infrequently used route, seemed
rigid and did not look at the officer as he passed, and that the defendant’s
children began to wave mechanically, as if being instructed to wave, and
seemed as if their feet were propped on top of something in the floor.155 The
officer pulled the van over and found over one hundred pounds of marijuana in
the van, but the Ninth Circuit held that the officer did not have proper
reasonable suspicion to stop the van, citing uncertainty and unpredictability.156
However, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to search the van based on a combination of all the
relevant factors.157 Based on a “totality of the circumstances,” the Supreme
Court held that the officer did have reasonable suspicion to stop the van,
admitting that “each of these factors alone is susceptible of innocent

151
152
153
154
155
156
157

381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 484–85.
534 U.S. 266 (2002).
Id. at 269–71.
Id. at 271–73.
Id. at 277.
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explanation.”158 Despite the fact that none of the factors likely would have
been sufficient in their own right, the Court explained that “[t]aken together,
we believe they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for [the
officer’s] stopping the vehicle.”159
This “totality of the circumstances” analysis is similar to the colorable
claim approach of hybrid rights. As Arvizu shows, a border patrol officer can
combine all of the relevant factors in order to obtain reasonable suspicion to
search a vehicle. Just as one strange act of behavior by one car is not enough
by itself to search a vehicle, one claim of compelled speech or interference
with a child’s education may not be sufficient to win an exemption from a law.
However, if a border patrol officer can combine factors to serve as a basis to
protect national security, a litigant should be able to combine rights to protect a
right so precious and important as the right to the free exercise of religion.
When the government violates multiple constitutional rights, these claims
should stack up against the government, and the courts should protect a litigant
from such offenses. The Constitution and the importance of religious freedom
demand nothing less.
C. The Colorable Claim Approach Has Offered the Most Protection in the
Lower Courts
Finally, while no circuit court of appeals has decided a free exercise claim
on the basis of any of the hybrid rights approaches,160 district courts have done
so with a colorable claim approach that has been workable.161 Only courts that
are willing to apply the colorable standard have been able to properly provide
religious liberty protection to litigants.162 In the decades immediately following
Smith, federal district courts began applying hybrid rights, and although there
are not many victories for religious claimants, those raising free exercise–free

158

Id.
Id. at 277–78.
160 See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 (1st Cir. 2008) (“No published circuit court opinion . . . has
ever applied strict scrutiny to a case in which plaintiffs argued they had presented a hybrid claim.”). As of the
writing of this Comment, this statement remains true.
161 See Tuttle, supra note 128, at 769.
162 Many cases were decided before the three-way circuit split concerning Smith—as to whether Smith’s
hybrid claims language was merely dicta, allowed for independent claims, or allowed for colorable claims—
emerged. However, the analysis that a strong companion claim would invoke strict scrutiny is sufficiently
similar to the colorable claim approach to be a useful point of comparison.
159
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speech hybrid rights claims have had the most success by far, as seen in two
examples.163
First, in Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy
Independent School District, students challenged their school’s dress code,
which required them to wear their hair short, as a violation of their First
Amendment rights.164 The district court held that the students had successfully
alleged a hybrid claim of free exercise and free speech rights that must pass
strict scrutiny in order to be valid.165 Because the school failed to show that the
dress code restriction was a valid means of achieving its objectives to, among
other things, maintain discipline and foster respect for authority, the court held
that this restriction violated the students’ First Amendment rights and granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the dress code.166
Second, in Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of
Evanston, a church brought a hybrid rights claim against a city’s zoning
ordinance that prevented the use of the property for worship or prayer,
claiming that the law violated its rights to free exercise and free speech.167
After noting that the Seventh Circuit had not given it any precedent by which
to abide, the district court chose to adopt the colorable claim approach as stated
by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.168 The court then held that this case was
analogous to the cases cited in Smith, which all invoked a combination of
rights, as invoking hybrid rights and applied strict scrutiny to the ordinance.169
In addition to hybrid free speech cases, cases that combine a free exercise
claim with the right of parents to direct their children’s education and
upbringing have resulted in successful hybrid rights claims as well. In Hicks ex
rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education, a student’s legal guardian and
great-grandmother cited religious reasons in challenging a school board’s
mandatory uniform policy.170 The court explained that the Smith Court’s
163 For a thorough analysis of hybrid rights cases through 1997, see William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious
Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
211 (1998), and see also, for example, Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District, 976 F. Supp 659,
671 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that the schools prohibition on wearing rosaries violated plaintiff’s hybrid rights
of free exercise and free speech).
164 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
165 Id. at 1332.
166 Id. at 1333, 1336.
167 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963–64 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
168 Id. at 989.
169 Id.
170 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 652 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
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decision to distinguish, rather than overrule, Yoder suggests that hybrid claims
combining free exercise rights and the right of parents’ to direct the upbringing
of their children necessitates heightened scrutiny.171 Therefore, the court held
that these two claims, in combination, were sufficient to invoke the hybrid
rights exception to the Smith rule.172
Although some state courts have looked very unfavorably upon the hybrid
rights doctrine,173 not all state courts have been completely bereft of success
for religious liberty claimants. In Shepp v. Shepp, a mother sued her
ex-husband, a Mormon, because he was teaching their child about
polygamy.174 The court explained that although the state statute criminalizing
polygamy is a generally applicable law and that engaging in polygamy would
violate this state law, the father had successfully presented a hybrid rights
claim by combining the right to freely exercise his religion along with the right
to direct the upbringing of his child.175 As long as the father’s teachings did not
harm the child’s welfare, his teaching could not be suppressed.176
The cases above show that the hybrid rights doctrine can be used to grant
constitutional equity to free exercise claimants. Each of the cases above
employs a combination of protected rights to provide relief for a religious
liberty claimant, a combination that would not be possible under the dicta or
independent-claims approaches. The fact that religion is involved creates an
even greater case to protect a claimant from undue burden. An individual
constitutional claim may not be strong enough to succeed on its own, but in
combination with the precious right to the free exercise of religion, the claim
should succeed.
While there are examples of successful hybrid rights claims, the vast
majority of which are found in the context of free speech and the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children, hybrid rights cases generally
have been few and far between. Because so many circuit courts of appeals
have refused to recognize hybrid rights or have required independent claims,
171

Id. at 661.
Id. at 662.
173 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 88 (Cal. 2004) (“Assuming
for the sake of argument the hybrid rights theory is not merely a misreading of Smith . . . .”); Catholic Charities
of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 464 (N.Y. 2006) (“The notion of ‘hybrid rights’ is derived
from a dictum . . . .”).
174 906 A.2d 1165, 1167–68 (Pa. 2006).
175 Id. at 1172–73.
176 Id. at 1173–74.
172
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many district courts are unable to apply hybrid rights.177 However, recent
victories for litigants claiming hybrid rights have emerged from district courts
in the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, along with state courts.178
While many district courts are bound by the authority of their respective circuit
courts of appeals on this issue, those courts that have ruled in favor of hybrid
rights litigants have shown that a combination of rights, the colorable claim
approach, is the best and only way to effect protection based on hybrid rights
claims.
It is important to realize that only cases invoking a colorable claim
approach can provide true meaning to the hybrid rights doctrine as the dicta
approach forecloses the idea of hybrid rights and the independent-claims
approach does not undergo the hybrid rights analysis. Ultimately, any court
that adopts and applies the colorable claim approach to hybrid rights claims
will afford greater religious liberty to claimants, as seen through the above
cases. By granting an exemption, a court is not invalidating a law completely;
it is simply providing constitutional equity by granting a claimant an
exemption from an otherwise valid law. The colorable claim approach does not
let just any companion claim through the door. Instead, only those claims that
have a probability of success are allowed as companion claims. While a
determination that a companion claim is colorable will require the reviewing
court to balance the factors on each side, the fact that religious liberty is such a
precious and protected right justifies this balance.
IV. EXPANDING THE HYBRID RIGHTS DOCTRINE
The colorable claim approach is the best tool to expand the hybrid rights
doctrine of the Free Exercise Clause in a manner that remains within the
parameters of Supreme Court precedent. Such an expansion will provide
greater religious protection for litigants while not overstepping the bounds of
the Supreme Court’s interpretation. This Comment argues that even greater
religious liberty protection can be accomplished, first, by applying companion
claims that have not previously been used to form colorable hybrid rights

177

See supra Part II.
See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1222 (D. Utah 2013) (Tenth Circuit); Netherland v. City
of Zachary, 626 F. Supp. 2d 603, 610 (M.D. La. 2009) (Fifth Circuit); Vineyard Christian Fellowship of
Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Seventh Circuit); Hicks ex rel.
Hicks v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 664 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (Fourth Circuit); Shepp, 906
A.2d 1165 (Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
178
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combinations and, second, by reconsidering the balancing test under the strict
scrutiny standard of review to be utilized in the hybrid claims context.
A. Diverse Companion Claims
While the vast majority of cases decided under the hybrid rights rationale
have dealt with the freedom of speech or parents’ right to direct their child’s
education and upbringing as companion claims,179 this Comment argues that
the hybrid rights doctrine should be readily applied to other companion claims
as well in order to provide more protection for religious liberty. Granted, there
must be limits to which claims are acceptable,180 but, again, the companion
claim does not necessarily have to be an expressly enumerated constitutional
right.181 This approach does not advocate a position that any regulation that
could be against one’s religion is “presumptively invalid;”182 instead, it is
important to remember that hybrid rights claims usually are seeking only an
exemption from the law, not a ruling that the law at issue is unconstitutional. It
is also important to remember that a finding that a companion claim is
colorable is not dispositive to a victory for the claimant.183 Instead, such a
finding only means that the government will engage in a balancing test to
determine if the government has a compelling interest in burdening these
rights.184 Thus, courts should not fear a finding that a hybrid rights claim
exists, since doing so does not immediately imply success for the claimant.
These potential companion claims to hybrid rights combinations that can
expand the scope of the doctrine include the freedom of association and other
constitutional protections implied within the Smith decision.

179

See supra Part III.C.
Am. Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991) (“There would
be little left of the Smith decision if an additional interest of such slight constitutional weight as ‘the right to
hire’ were sufficient to qualify for this exception.”).
181 Justice Scalia only required the companion claim to afford a “constitutional protection[].” Emp’t Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). For example, the right of parents to direct the education of their children,
while not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, is an acceptable companion claim. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
182 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (“[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to
the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.”).
183 See supra Part III.A.
184 See infra Part IV.B.
180
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1. Freedom of Association
The right to freely associate185 should be an acceptable hybrid rights
companion claim by which litigants may receive religious liberty protection.
Justice Scalia’s language in Smith explicitly mentions certain companion
claims, such as freedom of association, that could be joined to form a hybrid
rights claim,186 but courts have been much more skittish in applying this right
as a companion claim. In fact, the freedom of association’s first application to
the hybrid rights doctrine after Smith, in Salvation Army v. Department of
Community Affairs,187 was quite damning, and it has not been actively applied
ever since.
In Salvation Army, The Salvation Army, operators of a religious
rehabilitation facility, challenged a New Jersey boarding ordinance as violating
its First Amendment rights to freely exercise its religion and to associate.188
The court considered the hybrid claim and analyzed the two types of
association claims: freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive
association.189 The court quickly dismissed the notion that the freedom of
intimate association applied to the facts of the case and then considered
whether the freedom of expressive association applied.190 The court admitted
that The Salvation Army had a constitutional right to expressive association
but stated that this right could not help it in the case.191 Because the Supreme
Court had not yet provided the guidelines to determine an appropriate approach
to freedom of association hybrids, the court held that this “derivative right”
could not receive protection with the free exercise claim.192
However, this outcome should not result in the rejection of all freedom of
association hybrid claims. Because it considered the freedom of association to
be a derivative right, the court’s approach in Salvation Army is at odds with
other Supreme Court precedent in that it did not even look for a hybrid
situation, once it was clear that another constitutional protection was
185 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right
to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”).
186 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (“And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of
association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.”).
187 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990).
188 Id. at 185, 196.
189 Id. at 198–200.
190 Id. at 198.
191 Id. at 199.
192 Id. at 199–200.
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implicated.193 When a freedom of association hybrid rights claim arises, the
reviewing court should not simply dismiss the case, as the court in Salvation
Army did; instead, the court should actually engage in a hybrid rights
analysis.194 Here, the freedom of association companion claim had a probable
enough chance of success on the merits to be considered a “colorable”
showing. At the end of the day, the law in Salvation Army instructed a private,
religious organization to act against its mission, and this should certainly have
been considered tenable enough to present a colorable claim that, in turn,
should have led the court to balance the competing interests.195
While the Supreme Court did not give an example of a successful freedom
of association hybrid rights claim, the Court did provide guidance for what one
might look like.196 Even though the Supreme Court has said that it is “easy to
envision a case”197 in which an associational right is combined with the Free
Exercise Clause, reviewing courts simply have not done so.198 Granted, one
could argue that every hybrid rights claim is a viable combination of the rights
to free exercise and the right to freedom of association because a claimant
almost always belongs to a religious group.199 However, the freedom of
association companion claim is only meant to apply when a specific group’s
rights to free exercise are being violated.200 If the government is burdening or
compelling a religious group to act against its religious conscience, such an

193

See Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the
“Hybrid Situation” in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 833, 852 (1993) (arguing that the
result in Salvation Army is at odds with Yoder since the companion claim in Yoder was not sufficient by itself,
yet it received hybrid analysis while the companion claim in Salvation Army did not receive hybrid analysis at
all).
194 See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1222 (D. Utah 2013) (holding that Plaintiffs had made a
colorable claim as to their freedom of association claim).
195 See infra Part IV.B.
196 See supra note 64.
197 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
198 Courts very rarely use freedom of association as the companion claim in a hybrid rights claim, but one
court recently used the freedom of association claim, among other constitutional claims, to form a hybrid
rights claim, holding as follows: “This is the case envisioned by Justice Scalia because Plaintiffs’ various
colorable constitutional claims relating to the cohabitation prong of the Statute, including a claim under
freedom of association, are ‘reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.’” Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1221
(quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 882).
199 In Smith, for example, the claimants were both members of the Native American Church. Smith, 494
U.S. at 874. However, membership alone is not enough to bring a colorable freedom of association companion
claim. See id.
200 Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts of America did not
have to include an adult leader in its organization because such inclusion would burden the organization’s
ability to advocate a viewpoint).
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example should suffice to form a hybrid rights claim that would then proceed
to a balancing of the interests.
Courts should look to apply freedom of association hybrid rights claims to
situations where a state actor is forcing a group to include members it objects
to or to promote ideas that are disfavored by the group. Although sparsely
used, the freedom of association should carry the same weight as all the other
constitutional protections mentioned in Smith.201 In these situations, courts
should not fear finding a hybrid rights situation and undertaking a compelling
interest analysis. Failing to perform a hybrid rights balancing test forecloses
religious protection to litigants and incorrectly disallows litigants from
bringing worthy hybrid claims to the judicial system. Thus, courts should allow
the freedom of association to be an acceptable companion claim to hybrid
rights with just as much frequency as free speech or the right of parents to
direct their child’s upbringing.
2. Other Constitutional Protections
Another way to increase the scope of religious liberty protection is to
branch out to other constitutional companion claims that traditionally have not
been used as companion claims. The only requirement given in Smith is that
the companion claim afford “constitutional protection[].”202 Toward the end of
his majority opinion in Smith, Justice Scalia stated, “The rule respondents
favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”203 He
then went on to mention eleven such exemptions—such as compulsory
military service, the payment of taxes, child labor laws, and environmental
protection laws—that “[t]he First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty
does not require.”204 In her concurring opinion to Smith, Justice O’Connor
referred to this list as a “parade of horribles,”205 and Justice Scalia retorted that
“[i]t is a parade of horribles because it is horrible to contemplate that federal
judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the
significance of religious practice.”206

201
202
203
204
205
206

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 889 n.5. (majority opinion).
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Despite Justice Scalia’s strong language opposing a balancing test between
religious liberty and certain civic obligations, he explained that the purpose of
his parade was “not to suggest that courts would necessarily permit harmful
exemptions from these laws (though they might)” but to keep courts from
constantly determining whether an exemption was required.207 Thus, this
language implies that other rights, including rights mentioned in this “parade
of horribles,” can qualify as companion claims worthy of hybrid rights
analysis. Although such exemptions will not be easily granted, the possibility
still exists and should be explored by litigants.
For an example of hybrid rights claims that were not expressly mentioned
in Smith yet are worthy of hybrid rights analysis, consider the recent case of
Brown v. Buhman.208 In Brown, the plaintiffs challenged a Utah statute
forbidding cohabitation as violating the Free Exercise Clause along with
multiple other constitutional provisions.209 Upon review, the court followed the
Tenth Circuit’s precedent, adopted the colorable claim approach, and held that
each of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims—freedom of association,
substantive due process, equal protection, free speech, and the Establishment
Clause—made a colorable showing of a constitutional violation, meriting strict
scrutiny.210 Except for freedom of association and freedom of speech claims,
the other claims were not expressly mentioned in the Smith decision.211 The
court correctly allowed multiple constitutional claims, even combinations such
as free exercise combined with intimate association or the Establishment
Clause, to serve as colorable companion claims. Again, a “constitutional
protection[]” is all that Smith required.212
The first and most prominent way that the hybrid rights doctrine can be
expanded is by applying the doctrine to more cases than just those involving
free speech and the right of parents to direct their children’s upbringing. While
these two examples have gathered the most attention and success in courts, the
hybrid formula does not exclusively apply to these two rights. The hybrid
formula is simply a combination of more than one constitutional protection. As
stated throughout this Comment, the mere invocation of a companion claim by
itself is not sufficient for a hybrid rights claim. However, a companion claim
207
208
209
210
211
212

Id.
947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1222.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
Id. at 881.
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should not be precluded just because it is not an ordinary companion claim.
While free speech and the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children are certainly two protections that can be raised in a hybrid rights
claim, many other protections—such as equal protection, due process, or even
the freedom to contract—should be allowed to combine to form a hybrid rights
claim. The importance of religious freedom demands that these other
constitutional protections be considered.213
B. Relevant Factors for Consideration
While the approach to free exercise litigation changed dramatically with the
Smith decision, many earlier cases were distinguished from it and remain good
law. However, two largely unresolved questions remain: how did these cases
survive, and how should courts deal with cases that present a valid hybrid
rights claim?
To deal with this uncertainty, this Comment asserts that the primary issue is
not with a particular hybrid rights standard; instead, the issue is with the
balancing test of strict scrutiny analysis. A determination that a companion
claim is colorable would not bring about an automatic win for the claimant.
Once a claimant has presented a valid hybrid rights claim, the reviewing court
then balances the government’s interest against the claimant’s.
As previously discussed, litigants should be able to use the colorable claim
hybrid rights approach in order to get to a strict scrutiny balancing test with
greater ease than has been the case over the past two decades.214 In free
exercise strict scrutiny analysis, such a balancing test should not be “‘strict’ in
theory, fatal in fact.”215 The government is much more likely to prove a
compelling interest regarding religious liberty than one regarding an issue such
as race, evident by the government’s far greater success in religious liberty
strict scrutiny cases than all others.216 Thus, courts should not be afraid of

213 For an analysis of a hybrid rights claim combining a free exercise claim and a constitutionally
protected freedom of contract claim, see infra Part V.
214 See supra Part III.
215 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
216 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796–97, 813 (2006) (conducting an empirical study of court opinions
applying strict scrutiny from 1990 to 2003 and concluding that the government satisfied strict scrutiny in 60%
of religious liberty cases and only 24% in all other cases).
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undertaking a thorough balancing of the competing interests in regard to
religious liberty.
Current courts, state and federal alike, should be guided by three main
factors: (1) is the claimant being compelled to act; (2) would granting an
exemption injure others; and (3) would granting an exemption violate the
Establishment Clause? By analyzing each of these three factors, courts can be
true to historical free exercise jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s free
exercise interpretation since Smith. Rather than constrain hybrid rights free
exercise claims solely to occurrences with the exact fact patterns found in the
Smith opinion,217 this Comment proposes that these three relevant questions
can guide courts in making decisions that can permissibly expand the hybrid
rights doctrine. The answers to these three inquiries should inform a reviewing
court whether an exemption should be granted from a general law.
1. Is the Claimant Being Compelled to Act?
There are two types of laws that claimants challenge as violating their free
exercise rights: laws that prohibit a claimant from acting and laws that require
a claimant to act.218 This Comment argues that courts should examine laws that
compel action with much greater scrutiny than those that merely prohibit
action. Just because a law compels action does not mean that an exemption is
deserved, just as a law prohibiting conduct may validly require an exemption.
Instead, this section will argue that the Supreme Court’s decisions show that
laws that prohibit conduct are not as intrusive into one’s right to the free
exercise of religion, as opposed to laws which compel action, which are more
intrusive.
First, laws that prohibit action are not as intrusive as laws that compel
action and reviewing courts should take this into account. This idea stretches
back to some of the first cases challenging the Free Exercise Clause, which
dealt with polygamy.

217 See Note, supra note 114, at 1511 (arguing for lower courts only to use hybrid rights with cases that
closely resemble Smith, particularly Yoder and Cantwell).
218 In each of the following examples reviewed in this Part, cases requiring a claimant to act all deal with
compelled action, not just telling the litigant he is required to stop an action. For example, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, one might argue that the government prohibited the claimant from distributing pamphlets, but
really, the government required the claimant to obtain a license to distribute his material. See 310 U.S. 296,
306–07 (1940). In contrast, consider again the facts in Smith: the government did not compel any action but
prohibited the claimants from ingesting peyote. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law
prohibiting polygamy against a challenge that such a law violated the Free
Exercise Clause.219 The Court was concerned that if someone were allowed to
practice polygamy based on a religious belief, he could also practice “human
sacrifices” or a woman could “burn herself upon the funeral pile for her dead
husband” under the cover of religious belief without government
interference.220 Reynolds was the first of many cases dealing with polygamy
and the Free Exercise Clause, but the individuals in subsequent cases lost each
time.221 In each of these cases, the government did not compel action at all.
Instead, in these cases and many others, the government simply maintained
that the action at hand was prohibited.222
Second, it is an entirely different inquiry when the government compels
someone to act, and litigants have had far greater protection when the
government requires action. The vast majority of successful pre-Smith free
exercise claimants dealt with this exact issue: the law forced the claimant to act
in violation of religious beliefs. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the claimant’s child was required to salute the flag in violation of the
family’s religion.223 In Sherbert v. Verner, the claimant was required to work
on Saturday in violation of her religious beliefs.224 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
claimant’s child was required to attend school past the eighth grade in violation
of the family’s sincere religious beliefs.225 In each of these three cases, the
government compelled the claimant to act against religious beliefs, and the
government lost each time.226
These results are correct because the government cannot coerce beliefs and
matters of conscience.227 Thus, courts should be much more willing to grant
219

98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
Id.
221 See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341, 343–45 (1890).
222 See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding that refusing to allow a Muslim
prison inmate to attend a weekly religious service did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that a military regulation forbidding petitioner from wearing his
yarmulke with his military uniform did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
223 319 U.S. 624, 626–29 (1943).
224 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
225 406 U.S. 205, 207–09 (1972).
226 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
227 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”); see also WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS,
supra note 24, app. 2 at 299–303 (exhibiting that forty-two of the forty-eight state constitutions had a general
clause explicitly protecting the liberty of conscience, rights of conscience, or both).
220
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exemptions when the government compels action because this inevitably
involves requiring one to act against his conscience. However, it is important
to note that while reviewing courts should apply a greater level of scrutiny to a
law that compels action, this does not mean that an exemption will be issued
anytime a claimant is compelled to act against his religious beliefs. In fact,
there are many examples to the contrary. In Bowen v. Roy, a child’s parents
contended that obtaining a Social Security number for their daughter, as
required by law, would violate their Native American religious beliefs.228
Although this law directly required the claimants to act against their religious
consciences, the Supreme Court explained that “we cannot ignore the reality
that denial of such benefits by a uniformly applicable statute neutral on its face
is of a wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion.”229
Even though this action “indirectly and incidentally call[ed] for a choice
between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs,”
the Court held that an exemption could not be granted.230
What is interesting about this case is that even though it was pre-Smith, it
presents an example of a modern-day hybrid rights claim, combining the free
exercise of religion with the right of parents to direct their child’s upbringing.
However, even if this case were brought today, the result would be the same
under this Comment’s proposal. Even though the government is compelling
action, the difference in this case is that the government had a compelling
interest in Bowen, one that it did not have in Barnette, Sherbert, or Yoder. The
government has a strong interest in a uniform social security system without
exemptions,231 and a far less compelling interest in whether, for example, a
child goes to school beyond the eighth grade.232 A child’s education is very
important, but that interest does not outweigh the parents’ right to control the
upbringing of their child combined with the right to the free exercise of
religion. Courts should not be hesitant to balance competing interests under the
compelling interest test. Claims that do not present strong hybrid claims will
not win, but those worthy hybrid claims will have a greater chance of success
when balanced against the government’s interest.

228

476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986).
Id. at 704.
230 Id. at 706.
231 Id. at 707 (“[F]or the administration of welfare programs reaching many millions of people, the
Government is entitled to wide latitude.”).
232 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
229
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2. Would Granting an Exemption Injure Others?
The second factor in determining whether a free exercise hybrid rights
claim is worthy of an exemption is one that has gained a significant amount of
attention in recent years: injury to others that violates an antidiscrimination
statute. Granting religious exemptions so long as they do not injure others is
not a novel or original concept in any way. Both historical documents and the
Supreme Court have established that religious exemptions are not to cause
injury to the public.
An early example of this notion of religious freedom that doesn’t injure or
interfere with the rights of others is found in early state free exercise
provisions. As early as 1663, Rhode Island provided for the free and full
enjoyment of judgments and conscience so long as these are not acts “to the
civill injurye or outward disturbeance of others.”233 Even where injury was not
explicitly mentioned, the most common feature of these state free exercise
provisions was the government’s right to protect public peace and safety.234
New York’s 1777 Constitution allowed liberty of conscience but qualified the
grant by providing that it “shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this
State.”235 These provisions made it clear that no matter how strong the freedom
of conscience claim might be, there are occasions when the injury to another
will outweigh the freedom of conscience claim.
Throughout American history, the Supreme Court has frequently
reaffirmed the notion that religious exemptions cannot be granted when it
would cause injury or harm to another. As far back as 1890, the Supreme Court
explained that the free exercise of religion “was intended to allow every one
under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting
his relations to his Maker . . . not injurious to the equal rights of others.”236 In
1940, the Court reaffirmed, “Nothing we have said is intended even remotely
to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit
frauds upon the public.”237 With all of this in consideration, the Supreme Court
has not had great opportunity to adjudicate strong free exercise claims against
claims that such an exemption would be injurious to others. To be sure, most
233
234
235
236
237

McConnell, supra note 25, at 1426 (quoting R.I. CHARTER of 1663) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. at 1464.
Id. at 1456 (quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII).
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
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free exercise claims, especially hybrid rights free exercise claims, cause injury
to no one.
However, recently, there have been numerous challenges that requiring
vendors to provide services to same-sex couple wedding ceremonies violates
the vendors’ constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.238 These
challenged vendors have included florists, bakers, and photographers, among
others.239 How, then, should the Supreme Court handle these competing claims
under a hybrid rights approach?
This Comment asserts that the Supreme Court should give particular
scrutiny to free exercise claims that are injurious to others or that interfere with
others’ rights, but what counts as sufficient injury? While accommodating
religious rights for some may be inconvenient for others, this Comment argues
that those who enter the public forum for commercial business should not be
allowed an exemption from serving homosexuals. The claimants may have a
legitimate hybrid rights claim, but such a claim will not be successful under a
balancing test because the government has a compelling interest in preventing
discrimination. While most challenges have yet to reach advanced stages of
litigation, two of these cases can serve as examples of how courts have begun
to handle these competing claims.
In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, a commercial photography business
refused to take pictures at a same-sex wedding ceremony, citing violation of
the free exercise of religion.240 Although this would have been an ideal case for
a free exercise–free speech hybrid claim, the hybrid rights claim was not
properly briefed.241 As such, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause had not been violated since the antidiscrimination statute
was a “neutral law of general applicability.”242 Similarly, an administrative law
judge recently held that a commercial bakery’s refusal to make a cake for a
same-sex wedding violated the same-sex couple’s rights under a Colorado
antidiscrimination statute, and the judge denied the bakery’s free exercise–free
speech hybrid claim.243 If these cases are decided in favor of the business
238 See Editorial, Can Discrimination Be Legal?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2013, at A24, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/12/opinion/la-ed-weddings-20131212.
239 Id.
240 309 P.3d 53, 72 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
241 Id. at 76.
242 Id. at 75.
243 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., Case No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Office of Admin. Cts. Dec. 6,
2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_no._cr_2013-0008.pdf;
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owners on another basis such as compelled speech or expressive association,244
then that is a different matter, but the right to the free exercise of religion
should not be invoked when it would amount to the injury of discrimination
based on sexual orientation. While a federal court has yet to rule on a case
involving wedding services vendors, these two examples above show that
courts are unlikely to be in the business of granting exemptions that would be
injurious to another.
Although both cases above feature attractive free exercise and free speech
hybrid rights claims that seem to apply, a hybrid rights argument would have
failed even if the reviewing courts had applied strict scrutiny since protecting
citizens from discrimination is certainly a compelling governmental interest.
Even though both respondents in the previous two examples had sincere beliefs
and weren’t acting with any sort of animus toward same-sex couples, this
Comment argues that both of these cases were decided correctly. These cases
make it clear: when someone enters the public business forum, the hybrid
rights approach to the Free Exercise Clause cannot provide an exemption from
an antidiscrimination statute.245
However, most free exercise cases to date have not involved injury to
others. In Barnette,246 no one was injured by an exemption permitting the
student to not salute the flag. In Yoder,247 no one was injured by an exemption
permitting the Amish parents to remove their child from school after the eighth
grade. And in Hicks,248 no one was injured by an exemption from following a
school board’s mandatory uniform policy.
Those who run public businesses should not be granted an exemption from
an antidiscrimination statute if it would result in injury to another, but with this
protection in mind, reviewing courts should not quickly shoot down those

see also Michael Paulson, Can’t Have Your Cake, Gays Are Told, and a Rights Battle Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/cant-have-your-cake-gays-are-told-anda-rights-battle-rises.html.
244 See Brief of Amici Curiae The Cato Institute et al. at 5, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d
53 (N.M. 2013) (No. 33, 687), 2012 WL 5990629 (arguing that the case should be decided solely on
compelled speech grounds).
245 In this situation, the government, through an antidiscrimination statute, is compelling the
photographers to act. This factor leans in favor of granting an exemption for the photographers. However, the
fact that such an exemption would be injurious to the same-sex couple tilts the balance in favor of denying an
exemption.
246 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
247 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
248 See Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
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hybrid rights cases in which claimants request an exemption and the result will
not injure anyone. Just because there is no injury to another certainly does not
mean that the exemption should immediately be granted. Hybrid rights analysis
remains a balancing test that any reviewing court should undertake with great
thoroughness and with an eye toward whether anyone would be injured by an
exemption.
3. Would Granting an Exemption Violate the Establishment Clause?
Finally, when a court considers granting a hybrid rights exemption, such an
exemption cannot provide a benefit to the litigant that a nonreligious litigant
would not receive, solely on the basis of religion. Allowing such a benefit
because of religion would clearly violate the Establishment Clause.249 The
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause “are frequently in
tension,”250 but “there is room for play in the joints” between the two
clauses.251 This Comment argues that an exemption that carries with it some
form of economic or social benefit, solely on the basis of religion, would
violate the Establishment Clause. However, an exemption that carries with it
some form of economic or social burden or neutral effect would not violate the
Establishment Clause and would provide support for a free exercise hybrid
rights exemption request.
A neutral outcome to an exemption does not violate the Establishment
Clause and provides support for the hybrid rights exemption request. Neutral
outcomes to free exercise exemptions are quite common. For example, in
Barnette,252 the child did not receive any benefit from the exemption from
saluting the flag. Likewise, wearing one’s hair long in violation of a school’s
dress code policy is not a strong enough benefit to invoke Establishment
Clause concerns.253
However, there are free exercise claims in which granting an exemption
would likely violate the Establishment Clause. In United States v. Lee, a
member of the Old Order Amish claimed that the requirement to pay social
security taxes violated his free exercise right.254 The claimant argued that the
249

U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
251 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
252 See W. Va. Sate Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
253 See Ala. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319,
1334 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
254 455 U.S. 252, 254–55 (1982).
250
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Amish “believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly” and thus believe
that their religion prohibits accepting or contributing to the social security
system.255 Although this law directly required the claimant to act against his
religious conscience, the Supreme Court explained that the government’s
interest in mandatory contribution to the social security system was very high
and held that an exemption could not be afforded.256
Even if the Court had held that the claimant in Lee had presented a tenable
hybrid rights combination, an exemption likely would not have been
permissible as a violation of the Establishment Clause. An exemption in this
case would have allowed the employer to save money by not paying a
particular tax solely on the basis of religion. This is a benefit that any citizen,
religious or not, would prefer to receive. More claims should receive this type
of analysis, where the court actually balances the government’s interest against
the claimant’s, but an exemption cannot be granted when it would result in a
benefit for the claimant on the basis of religion.
V. THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE HYBRID RIGHTS DOCTRINE
By applying the framework of an expanded hybrid rights doctrine set out in
this Comment, a reviewing court can provide proper religious liberty
protection based on a balancing of the competing interests that is in line with
the Smith decision. The case set out in the Introduction, Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson,257 presents an example of a case featuring a hybrid rights claim
worthy of an exemption. The Tenth Circuit never received an opportunity to
discuss the hybrid rights approach again in this case because, after remanding
the case back to the district court, the parties eventually settled outside of
court.258 The facts of the case nonetheless present an ideal situation for the
hybrid rights doctrine to protect a claimant.
Under the colorable claim approach, the first question always is whether
the companion claim to the free exercise of religion claim is colorable. The
companion claims here, freedom of speech and freedom from compelled

255
256
257

1–12.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 258–59.
See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); see also supra text accompanying notes

258 Angie Welling, U., Axson-Flynn Settle Civil Rights Suit, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City),
July 15, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/595077344/U-Axson-Flynn-settlecivil-rights-suit.html.
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speech, were explicitly mentioned in the Smith decision,259 and Christina
Axson-Flynn certainly set forth a claim that this compelled speech argument
had at least a probable or colorable claim of success by itself. The program
forced her to speak against her will, and there is a chance that she could have
won solely on the compelled speech claim.260 Nonetheless, if she could not
have won on the compelled speech alone, her claim was colorable enough to
combine with her free exercise of religion claim to form a valid hybrid rights
claim.
Because there was a valid hybrid rights claim, the court would then balance
the interests of both Axson-Flynn and the public university under the strict
scrutiny standard, with an emphasis on the three factors set out in Part IV of
this Comment: compelled action, injury to others, and Establishment Clause
concerns. First, the school did, in fact, compel Axson-Flynn’s conduct.261 This
factor is not dispositive, but the reviewing court should give great scrutiny to
any policy compelling action. Second, granting an exemption would not have
been injurious to anyone else. No individual would have been injured by a
student’s omission of a handful of objectionable words, nor would the theater
program have been injured by this. Finally, there were no Establishment
Clause concerns. No one could mistake such an exemption as establishing any
form of religion, and Axson-Flynn was not afforded any benefit here; rather,
she simply substituted words in a monologue. Axson-Flynn did not benefit
because of her religious beliefs, and this exemption would not violate the
Establishment Clause.
Ultimately, Axson-Flynn v. Johnson is an example of how the hybrid rights
doctrine can protect a claimant’s right to the free exercise of religion. Although
Christina Axson-Flynn could not have received any type of damages for this
specific ordeal based on qualified immunity, future courts would be able to
grant damages, along with injunctions, once the colorable claim approach is
officially adopted. The policy in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson was neutral and
generally applicable, but this is an appropriate example of when an exemption
should be granted from a law or policy. This policy burdened Christina
Axson-Flynn’s freedom to exercise her religion, and an exemption could have

259

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that requiring the claimants to display the
state motto on their vehicle’s license plate violated their free speech rights based on compelled expression).
261 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290 (“There is no question that in the instant case, Defendants attempted to
compel Axson-Flynn to speak.”).
260
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easily been granted to protect her fundamental rights without subjecting her to
preferential treatment based on her religion.
Another way to analyze the hybrid rights approach advocated throughout
this Comment is by analyzing how a law similar to the federal contraception
mandate of the Affordable Care Act262 should be reviewed if a state legislature
or other state actor enacted it. As it is, challenges to the federal contraception
mandate are reviewed under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act since it is
a federal law, but what if a state passed a similar law compelling a business to
act against its owners’ conscience?
For background, the Supreme Court recently decided Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., a case in which closely held corporations challenged the
federal contraception mandate as violating their right to the free exercise of
religion.263 The mandate required health insurance coverage to include
“preventive care and screenings” for women, the scope of which would be
determined by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).264
In turn, the HRSA required all nonexempt employers to cover “[a]ll Food and
Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with
reproductive capacity.”265 However, the HRSA did establish exemptions for
some “religious employers.”266
According to the Court, the mandate gave these owners “a difficult choice:
either give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or
forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as
corporations.”267 First, the Court determined that for-profit, closely held
corporations fall under RFRA’s definition of “person.”268 Because nonprofit
corporations may receive free exercise and RFRA protection, the Court
262

See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012).
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
264 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
265 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (currently codified as
45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (alteration in original) (quoting Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2015))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
266 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2013). The guidelines exempted religious employers if they met the following
four criteria: they opposed contraceptive services, they operated as a nonprofit entity, they held themselves out
as a religious organization, and they self-certified. Id. § 147.131(b).
267 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
268 Id. at 2768–69.
263
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explained that it would not make sense if the term “person” “include[d] some
but not all corporations.”269 After determining that the contraceptive mandate
imposed a substantial burden on these closely held corporations’ exercise of
religion, the Court considered whether the mandate was in furtherance of a
compelling government interest and whether the mandate was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.270 Ultimately, the Court held that
the mandate was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s
interest because the government already was providing exemptions to
nonprofit organizations.271 Because the mandate was not the least restrictive
means of furthering the government’s interest, the Court held that the
contraception mandate violated RFRA and because of this statutory holding,
did not find it necessary to consider the First Amendment claim.272
In light of this case, the question remains: what would the hybrid rights
analysis look like if a state passed a similar contraception mandate? Because
the federal contraception mandate was analyzed under the federal RFRA, an
analysis of a state imposed contraception mandate provides another occasion to
apply a hybrid rights approach.273 This Comment concludes that a state
imposed contraception mandate would also present a successful hybrid rights
claim that would be worthy of an exemption.
Under the colorable claim approach, the first inquiry is always whether the
companion claim to the free exercise of religion claim is colorable. Here, the
companion claim would be the freedom to contract, a right not explicitly
mentioned in the Smith decision, but one that is a “constitutional
protection[].”274 Under the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution,
a state or local law cannot impair the obligation of contracts between two

269

Id. at 2769.
Id. at 2779.
271 Id. at 2782. “If, as HHS tells us, providing all women with cost-free access to all FDA-approved
methods of contraception is a Government interest of the highest order, it is hard to understand HHS’s
argument that it cannot be required under RFRA to pay anything in order to achieve this important goal.” Id. at
2781.
272 Id. at 2785.
273 In addition to the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), over half of the states have
either enacted a state RFRA compelling strict scrutiny or interpreted its Free Exercise Clause to require strict
scrutiny. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 982–83 (5th ed. 2014).
Presumably, a state with a RFRA or Free Exercise Clause compelling strict scrutiny would automatically apply
strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim. Thus, the following analysis applies to any of the remaining states that
do not automatically apply strict scrutiny to free exercise claims.
274 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
270
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parties.275 Although this “prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be
read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula,”276 the Supreme Court
has developed a three-part test to determine whether a particular law violates
the Contracts Clause: the law must not substantially impair a contractual
relationship, the state must have a “significant and legitimate public purpose
behind the regulation,” and the law must be “based upon reasonable conditions
and be of a character appropriate to the public purpose.”277
Here, a state law requiring a business to cover certain types of
contraception in violation of the owner’s conscience would satisfy the
colorable claim approach, as such a law would have a probability of success on
the merits. Although the state would have a sufficiently significant and
legitimate purpose behind such a regulation to satisfy the Supreme Court’s
second requirement mentioned above, the business would have a strong
argument that such a regulation does significantly impair its right to contract
with its employees and that such a law is not of a character appropriate to the
public purpose. As the argument would go, is there not another way to cover
contraception besides forcing business owners to act directly against their
conscience?
Not all government restrictions impair the right to freely contract. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that minimum wage laws do not violate
the freedom of contract.278 Minimum wage laws are one of the best examples
of laws that do not violate the Constitution because they protect “against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.”279
Here, a state imposed contraception mandate is not on the same level as a
federal minimum wage. The freedom of contract claim may not be strong
enough to win outright on its own, but it is probable enough to be a colorable
companion claim. With the addition of the business owners’ sincere claim that
abortion-inducing contraception would violate their conscience, this would be
a sufficiently colorable hybrid rights claim.
Because this would be a hybrid rights claim, the next step is to balance the
business owners’ interests against the government’s interest under the
compelling interest test. Recall that the compelling interest test should not
275

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . .”).
276 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
277 Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983).
278 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
279 Id. at 391.
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automatically result in success for the claimant, as it has become with other
issues brought under strict scrutiny, such as race. Instead, the reviewing court
would then consider the three factors set out in Part IV of this Comment:
compelled action, injury to others, and Establishment Clause concerns.
First, it is clear that the state would be compelling action with a
contraception mandate. The state would be stepping in and forcing certain
businesses to pay for certain types of contraception that they find
objectionable, such as those that induce abortions. Although compelling action
is not dispositive to success to a claimant on its own, it is a strong factor that
the government will have difficulty outweighing.
The second factor is whether providing an exemption to such a
state-imposed contraception mandate would be injurious to others. In regard to
this question, the dissent in Hobby Lobby argued that an accommodation for
the business owners would have an adverse effect on third parties, mainly the
“thousands of women” employed by the companies.280 However, the majority
noted that a very large number of employees are not covered under the
contraception mandate because their employers are exempt, including more
than “one-third of the 149 million nonelderly people in America with
employer-sponsored health plans” because they were enrolled in grandfathered
plans and 34 million more employees who are not covered because their
employers employ fewer than fifty people.281 It is obvious that women’s health
is an interest of the utmost importance; however, it is difficult to argue that an
exemption here would be overly injurious when there are already millions of
women whose employers are not forced to cover their contraception.282 This is
a different scenario than what is presented in the discrimination cases
regarding wedding services.283 In those types of cases, the customers are being
denied a specific service, that is, a specific person’s creation or a specific
person’s photography. Here, one can still receive the exact same contraception;
it simply must come from a source other than an objecting employer. Because
the government already exempts many other groups, such as nonprofit
employers, an exemption for for-profit corporations from covering these

280

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2764 (majority opinion).
282 Cf. id. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby
Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero.”).
283 See supra Part IV.B.2.
281
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abortion-inducing contraceptives should not be considered injurious to
others.284
The third factor is whether providing an exemption would violate the
Establishment Clause. The main issue here is making sure that the objecting
owners do not receive a benefit that nonreligious owners would not be entitled
to. However, here, the government already had other exemptions in place to
accommodate religious nonprofits.285 Although the insurance company will
pick up the cost when an employer receives an accommodation from the law,
according to the HHS itself, “this system imposes no net economic burden on
the insurance companies that are required to provide or secure the
coverage.”286 As seen in many cases throughout this Comment,
accommodating a religious conviction does not immediately constitute a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Here, it is difficult to argue that this
exemption would violate the Establishment Clause when the government has
already taken such measures to provide exemptions. Thus, this Comment
argues that an exemption to business owners would not violate the
Establishment Clause in this setting.
Both of the applications above show that the colorable claim approach can
be used to expand the hybrid rights doctrine. By allowing colorable companion
claims to join with a sincere free exercise claim, courts can provide greater
opportunity for claimants to receive religious liberty protection. Further, by
invoking a proper balancing test involving the three factors set out in Part IV, a
reviewing court can protect claimants from undue burdens on religious liberty.
CONCLUSION
By allowing colorable companion claims to join with a sincere free
exercise claim, courts can provide greater opportunity for litigants to receive
religious liberty protection. If anything, an expanded hybrid rights doctrine
will provide litigants with a forum to pursue their free exercise claims, claims
that might not otherwise see the light of day due to Smith’s rigid approach.

284 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (“Although HHS has made this system available to religious
nonprofits that have religious objections to the contraceptive mandate, HHS has provided no reason why the
same system cannot be made available when the owners of for-profit corporations have similar religious
objections.”).
285 See id.
286 Id. Further, “HHS has determined that this obligation will not impose any net expense on issuers
because its cost will be less than or equal to the cost savings resulting from the services.” Id. at 2763.
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Because religious liberty is so important to so many, such a right deserves as
much protection as possible.
Since Smith, a three-way circuit split has emerged, and litigants are left
with potential protection that is not uniform. Instead, the level of free exercise
protection that one can receive solely depends on the circuit in which the
claimant brings the case. Even if the Supreme Court refuses to allow greater
protection to naked free exercise claims, the Court should clarify and expand
the hybrid rights doctrine.
Such an expansion starts with adopting the colorable claim approach.
Under this approach, more hybrid rights cases could proceed to the next step,
the compelling interest test. Anyone could simply make multiple claims in an
effort to receive hybrid protection, but the claim must genuinely be colorable.
This would not result in sweeping numbers of colorable claims in the court
system, but it would certainly allow more claimants to have their interests
balanced against the government’s, and courts should not be fearful of this.
The expansion of the hybrid rights doctrine should continue by allowing
new claims, even ones that traditionally have not received hybrid protection, to
be used to obtain religious liberty protection besides the oft-used claims of free
speech and freedom of parents to direct their children’s upbringing. Again,
courts should not be timid in admitting that these claims can join a free
exercise claim to make a valid hybrid rights claim.
The pressing inquiry, then, is the balancing of the relevant factors. Just
because a court admits that a claimant has presented a hybrid rights situation
does not mean that the claimant automatically wins. Instead, the court will
balance the interests from both sides, and the court should pay unique attention
to certain factors. If a hybrid rights claimant is being compelled to act, an
exemption would not injure another, and granting an exemption would not
violate the Establishment Clause, the court should have a compelling reason
for not granting an exemption. Engaging in such an analysis is the proper
action that a reviewing court should take to ensure that one’s religious liberty
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is not being burdened. As stated in the Introduction, religious liberty is of the
utmost importance to so many, and an expansion of the hybrid rights doctrine,
by way of the colorable claim approach, can protect this important right.
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